Confrontation Clause Ruling To Be Applied Prospectively Only
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has determined that because his U.S. Supreme Court case created a "new" rule, Melendez-Diaz could not benefit from the 2009 decision retroactively.

September 25, 2011 /24-7PressRelease/ -- In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a chemical test report submitted by a state laboratory analyst is testimonial in nature. As a result, and in order for it to be admitted as evidence, the analyst must be available to testify in court about the test results.

The analyst's presence is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution.

The defendant, Melendez-Diaz, was involved in a second, later Commonwealth case, wherein he argued that his ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court case should apply to his second Commonwealth conviction.

His problem, however, was that the second case was "final" by the time the U.S. Supreme Court decided the first case. All appeals had been exhausted on that second case.

Nonetheless, he asked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (S.J.C.) to apply the U.S. Supreme Court decision retroactively to his second drug conviction.

The S.J.C. determined that because the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on this first case was a "new" rule, Melendez-Diaz could not benefit from the 2009 decision retroactively.

Retroactivity

The issue of whether a U.S. Supreme Court ruling applies retroactively to other cases depends on whether it establishes a new rule or extends an old rule.

If it merely extends or clarifies an existing, older rule, then the extension can be applied retroactively because the rule itself was already in existence.

If it is considered to be a "new" rule, on the other hand, it may not be applied retroactively. The rationale is that the rule was not in existence during the course of defendant's other prosecution, so the defendant should not receive the benefit of a non-existent rule.

So, is it "New?"

The problem for any court is determining whether a rule from another case is "new." Melendez-Diaz highlights the dilemma a court faces when addressing this question.

The U.S. Supreme Court's majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz states that its decision in the case is not new and is, "'little more than the application' of the new rule [first] announced in Crawford." If the S.J.C. agreed, the defendant in Melendez-Diaz would benefit retroactively from this decision to revive his first conviction.

Pursuant to its Constitution, however, Massachusetts is not bound by the determination of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding this issue. The S.J.C. specifically noted that "[t]he language used by the [U.S. Supreme] Court . . . is not conclusive in determining whether a rule is new."

In fact, the S.J.C. indeed reached a different conclusion. The S.J.C. reasoned that certificates of drug analysis were long permitted in cases as evidence under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. Viewing the issue in that light, the S.J.C. determined that the Supreme Court ruling was indeed a "new" rule.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was clearly sympathetic to the U.S. Supreme Court's Melendez-Diaz dissent, which characterized the majority opinion as having "overruled a long-standing precedent relied on in more than thirty-five States (and throughout the Federal courts), plainly resulting in the imposition of a substantial "new obligation on the States."

Because the S.J.C. found that it is a new rule, Melendez-Diaz does not receive the benefit of retroactive application to his other Massachusetts conviction.

Press Release Contact Information:

Findlaw PR